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The Need of and Justification for  
A General Competition-oriented  
Compulsory Licensing Regime 
         
Kung-Chung Liu*  
Abstract: 
There seems to be little or no discussion about the need of and justification for 
a general compulsory licensing that could be applicable to all IP laws. This 
author has previously argued, by referencing to competition law, in 2008 that it 
is paramount for the WTO to revise the TRIPS Agreement, so as to include 
substantive grounds for granting compulsory patent licenses. In so doing, the 
preservation of competition should be factored in as one of the public policy 
objectives . As a follow-up study this paper takes an IP-internal approach 
(therefore will only consult competition law in a very limited fashion) and strives 
to present a general compulsory licensing doctrine that can be included as an 
inherent and integral element of IP laws. However, any general theory runs the 
risk of overstating convergence and oversimplifying divergence. Bearing this 
possible shortcomings in mind, this paper focuses solely on one aspect of 
compulsory licensing, namely the protection of market competition, and 
leaving other public interests, such as the prevention of an epidemic, and 





Intellectual property (IP) laws must answer the following two fundamental 
questions in order to avoid being irrelevant and losing its legitimacy all together: 
1. How to better enhance the public interest during the process of ever 
strengthening of IP protection? 2. How to effectively reduce the transaction 
costs for using IP-protected products and services? In certain cases the 
refusal to license IP can negatively impact public interests and transaction 
costs. The ensuing conflict may be resolved by resorting to remedies 
extraneous to IP law such as competition law, and also to IP-internal remedy, 
mainly in the form of compulsory licensing. 
 
                                                 
* Research Fellow, Institutum Iurisprudentiae, Academia Sinica/Professor, Institute of Law for 
Science and Technology, National Tsing Hua University/Graduate Institute of Intellectual 
Property, National Chengchi University.  
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The issue of compulsory licensing dwells mainly in the field of patent. Joseph 
Kohler commented more than 110 years ago that the then German Patent Law 
was “exceedingly incomplete” because it lacked of direct compulsory license 
and foresaw only forfeiture of patent in case the patentee did not exercise 
his/her right1. Economist Pankaj Tandon suggested the use of compulsory 
license to reduce the deadweight loss created by patent monopoly: a very long 
patent accompanied by a very low regulated royalty rate on compulsory 
licenses is optimal to minimize the monopoly distortion per period while 
maintaining innovation incentives2.  
 
There seems to be little or no discussion about the need of and justification for 
a general compulsory licensing that could be applicable to all IP laws3. This 
author has previously argued, by referencing to competition law, in 2008 that it 
is paramount for the WTO to revise the TRIPS Agreement, so as to include 
substantive grounds for granting compulsory patent licenses. In so doing, the 
preservation of competition should be factored in as one of the public policy 
objectives4. As a follow-up study this paper takes an IP-internal approach 
(therefore will only consult competition law in a very limited fashion) and strives 
to present a general compulsory licensing doctrine that can be included as an 
inherent and integral element of IP laws. However, any general theory runs the 
risk of overstating convergence and oversimplifying divergence. Bearing this 
possible shortcomings in mind, this paper focuses solely on one aspect of 
compulsory licensing, namely the protection of market competition, and 
leaving other public interests, such as the prevention of an epidemic, and 
access to information out of its ambit.  
 
                                                 
1 J. Kohler, “Handbuch des deutschen patentrechts in rechtsvergleichender darstellung” 618 
(Mannheim, 1900). 
2 P. Tandon, “The Optimal Patents with Compulsory Licensing, Journal of Political Economy” 
470-86 (Dept. of Economics, Boston University, 1979). 
3 Admittedly the EU case-law deals with the application of Article 102 Treaty on the 
Functioning of European Union (TFEU, former Article 82 EC) to refusal to license and three 
of these decisions actually involved copyright (Magill, IMS Health, and Microsoft). But the 
case-law in the EU has developed mostly with regard to copyright law and not yet applied to 
other IP. Moreover, the European Court of Justice has not formulated any general theory on 
compulsory licensing. 
4 K-C Liu, “Rationalising the Regime of Compulsory Patent Licensing by the Essential 
Facilities Doctrine”, 39 IIC 772-773 (2008). 
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For the purpose of this paper, compulsory licensing refers to the use of 
protected IP without the consent of right holders upon payment of a reasonable 
remuneration5. If the remuneration is left to be negotiated, it is compulsory 
license properly so-called or compulsory license in the narrower sense. If the 
remuneration is fixed and no negotiation was needed, it is statutory license or 
compulsory license in the broader sense. In any case, the exclusivity right 
conferred by IP is downgraded to the right to remuneration6. 
 
In the following sections this paper first takes stock of the national practices on 
compulsory licensing, looks into certain international IP conventions and 
IP-related laws from advanced countries (no claim of comprehensiveness is 
made in this regard7) for support of such a hypothesis. The US, UK and 
Germany are taken as example, because they all appreciate the importance of 
protecting market competition by compulsory licenses in their respective 
domestic territories and yet take a double-standard approach in international I 
arena by avoiding to even mention the term compulsory license8. This paper 
will continue to put forward a theoretical analysis of a competition-oriented 
compulsory licensing of IP, and provide some suggestions for solving some 
thorny issues, such as the determination of the reasonable remuneration and 
the agency which is to administer compulsory licensing to make such proposal 
work. In the end, this paper makes an extended endeavour to challenge the 
soundness of the categorical denial of compulsory trademark licensing in the 
context of compulsory patent licensing to protect the general public.  
 
I. Taking Stock of National Practices of Compulsory Licensing 
The actual practice of granting compulsory licenses is rather low. As of August 
2007, only 11 developing countries have declared that they will avail 
themselves of the compulsory licenses faculties provided by the Berne 
                                                 
5 No international convention ever defines the meaning of compulsory licenses. 
6 G. Schricker & U. Loewenheim, Urheberrecht, 4 Aufl. 2010, Vor §§ 28ff Rdnr. 184, 185； K. 
Garnett, G. Davies & G. Harbottle, “Copinger & Skone James on Copyright” 28-02 (Sweet & 
Maxwell , 16th edition 2011). 
7 For a discussion of the US and EU competition law on unilateral refusal to license IP, see B. 
C. Gallego, “Unilateral Refusal to license Indispensible Intellectual Property Rights—US and 
EU approaches”, in: J. Drexl (ed.), “Research on Intellectual Property and Competition Law” 
215 et.seq. (Edward Elgar, 2008). 
8 For example, Art. 31 of the TRIPS Agreement deals with “other use without authorization of 
the right holder”, without mentioning “compulsory licenses”. 
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Convention9. To many people’s surprise, as in elsewhere in the world (Canada 
being the only exception), the actual grant of compulsory patent licenses is 
very limited in Asia, ranging from none (China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, 
Korea, Singapore) to only single digits (India, Malaysia, Taiwan and 
Thailand)10.These figures show that countries are using stringent discretion in 
exercising their rights and leeway to impose compulsory license.  
 
The fact that few grants have been made for compulsory IP licensing on a 
worldwide basis can be attributed to the unfriendly international regime. On the 
one hand, the Berne Appendix is overly strict11, complex, and ambiguous12. On 
the other, Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement establishes strict procedural 
safeguards13, so strict that led to an explosion of objections from developing 
countries over the effective denial of access to medicines to combat 
epidemics14, even though Members have fairly free hand to determine the 
grounds for granting compulsory licensing15. 
 
The practice of threatening to apply for WTO action by powerful Members also 
                                                 
9 S. Von Lewinski, “International Copyright Law and Policy” 5.233 (OUP, Oxford 2008). 
10 K-C Liu, “More Economic Approach to IPR and Competition Law—A Cross-Jurisdiction 
Study on Patent Pools”, in: Liu & Hilty, “Enforcement of Parents” Chapter 2 (Kluwer Law 
International, 2012). 
11 In order to take into consideration the economic situation and social/cultural needs of 
developing countries, the Berne Convention adopted the Paris Act and its Appendix 
(special provisions regarding developing countries) at the 1971 Paris Revision Conference. 
In essence, the Appendix confers upon developing countries the right to provide for 
compulsory licenses for the limited purposes of teaching, scholarship, research or 
systematic instructional activities regarding the rights of translation and reproduction, 
subject to just compensation, non-exclusive and non-assignable nature of such licenses.  
12 For detailed discussion, see K-C Liu, H. Sun, “A Universal Copyright Fund—A New Way to 
Bridge the Copyright Divide”, 1(2) NTU Law Review 40(2006). 
13 D. Gervais, “The TRIPS Agreement—Drafting History and Analysis” 2.282 (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 3r. ed., 2008,).  
14 W. Cornish, D. Llewelyn & T. Aplin, “Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademarks 
and Allied rights” 318 (Sweet & Maxwell, 2010). 
15 S. Harnisch, “Die Zwangslizenz im südafrikanischen und deutschen Patentrecht”60 (BWV 
Berliner-Wissenschaft, 2010); Nuno Pires de Carvalho, “The TRIPS Regime of Patent 
Rights” 31.4 (Kluwer Law International, 2nd Revised edition, 2005). 
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makes countries hesitant to resort to compulsory licensing16. For example, in 
contrast to the its case-law concerning the application of Article 102 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of European Union (TFEU, former Article 82) to 
refusal to license (Volvo, Magill, IMS Health, Microsoft), the European Union 
(EU) has reacted strongly against the decision of the Taiwanese Intellectual 
Property Office (TIPO) to grant compulsory license against Phillips. It 
demanded that Taiwan revise provisions on compulsory license and “ensure 
that precedential effects of the measures are eliminated, including ensuring 
that the compulsory licenses are revoked in their entirety” within two months 
from the transmission of the report to the TIPO17. Under such threat, the TIPO 
did undertake to revise the revisions, the result of which can be predicted (for 
more details see infra IV. B.1). 
 
II. Finding Support for Compulsory Licensing from International IP 
Conventions 
International IP conventions see compulsory licensing very differently. 
Notwithstanding that the TRIPS Agreement categorically denies compulsory 
trademark license, an ad hoc and haphazard recognition of compulsory 
copyright licensing with a special and yet unspoken concern for preserving 
market competition, and a general recognition of compulsory patent licensing 
that also has an eye for the preservation of market competition can be found in 
some international IP conventions. Further support can be found in Article 7 of 
the TRIPS Agreement which proclaims that “The protection and enforcement 
of intellectual property rights should be in a manner conducive to …economic 
welfare.” More and more people are advocating that the General Provisions 
and Basic Principles of the TRIPS Agreement should be taken as binding rules 
rather than declaration only18. 
                                                 
16 See Id. 
17 For the history of the Philips case (the TIPO’s decision to grant compulsory patent license 
against Philips and later to annul such grant, the Taipei Administrative High Court’s overrule 
of the TIPO’s decision to grant compulsory patent license), its core issues, namely the abuse 
of a joint monopolistic position, cartel, the aftermath and ramifications in the US and EU, 
please see K-C Liu, “The Taiwanese 'Philips' CD-R Cases: Abuses of a Monopolistic 
Position, Cartel and Compulsory Patent Licensing”, in: C. Heath & A. Sanders (eds.), 
“Landmark Intellectual Property Cases and Their Legacy” 92 et seq. (Aspen Pub, 2010). 
18 H. Xue, “Enforcement for development: why not an agenda for the developing world?”, in: X. 
Li & C. Correa (eds.), “Intellectual Property Enforcement- International Perspectives” 148 




A. No Compulsory Trademark Licensing according to the TRIPS 
Agreement 
Prior to the TRIPS Agreement, there has been no mentioning of compulsory 
licensing in the international trademark conventions. The TRIPS Agreement is 
the first to mention it, but only with a view of banning it. Article 21states that: ‘it 
being understood that the compulsory licensing of trademarks shall not be 
permitted’. It is remarkable that compulsory licensing is explicitly ruled out only 
in the field of trademark19, while allowed by both the Berne Convention and 
Paris Convention.  
 
The common justifications for such exclusion are twofold. First, the purpose of 
a trademark is to distinguish the goods or services of one undertaking from 
those of another, “it would be nonsensical to let a third party to use that link as 
identifying the product or service without the consent of (and control by) the 
trademark owner. In other words, compulsory trademark licensing would lead 
to the danger of confusion of consumers as to source of the goods20. Second, 
compulsory trademark licensing would deprive the trademark owner of the 
chance to control the quality of the goods that would bear his/her trademark 
and constitutes a disincentive to provide consumers with high quality goods21.  
 
B. Ad Hoc and Haphazard Compulsory Copyright Licensing 
The Berne Convention, the Rome Convention, and the TRIPS Agreement22 
recognize compulsory copyright licensing only in enumerated cases which 
have an undertone of preserving market competition for broadcasting and 
                                                                                                                                            
Trade System—Proposals for Reform of TRIPS” 529 et Seq. (Edward Elgar, 2011). 
19 Stoll, Busche & Arend (eds.), “WTO-Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights” 
349 (Martinus Nijhoff , 2009). 
20 A. Kur, “TRIPS and Trademark Law”, in F.-K. Beier & G. Schricker (eds.), “From GATTS to 
TRIPS: The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights” 114 
(Wiley-VCH, 1996). 
21 P. Regibeau & K. Rockett , “The Relationship Between Intellectual Property Law and 
Competition Law: An Economic Approach”, in: S. Anderman (ed.) , “The Interface between 
Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy” 544 (Cambridge University Press, 
2007). 
22 Art. 9(1) of the TRIPS Agreement takes over Arts. 1 through 21 and the Appendix of the 
Berne Convention (1971). 
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recording industries 23 . Economically speaking, performers, phonogram 
producers, collecting societies, music publishers and broadcasting 
organizations are in a vertical relationship of supply and demand of contents 
and service. It is not uncommon that the negotiations between these groups 
stall and lead to stalemate, sending the transaction costs for the use of 
copyrighted works skyrocketing; an intervention from the law is desirable.  
 
1. Limiting Dominant Collecting Societies and Music Publishers 
 
The Berne Convention allows its Members to impose only two specific types of 
compulsory licensing. One is on the right of broadcasting, communication to 
the public by wire, rebroadcasting, and of public communication by 
loudspeaker and etc. (Article 11bis(2))24. The other is on the right of recording 
musical works (Article 13(1))25 . Both were done “in the interests of the 
public,26” more specifically, “for the benefit of particular groups of the society,” 
namely broadcasting organizations and phonogram producers to 
counter-balance the dominant position of collecting societies and music 
publishers which “usually exercised monopolistic practices”27. That means 
exactly the preservation of competition.  
 
2. For Secondary Exploitation by Broadcasting Organisations 
 
(1)  Rebroadcasting the Consented Broadcast of Performance 
                                                 
23 In respect of the communication to the public of television broadcasts if such 
communication is made in places accessible to the public against payment of an entrance 
fee, the Rome Convention foresees a possibility of compulsory licensing and even statutory 
licensing that would limit broadcasting organizations’ right of public communication (13(d)) ( 
von Lewinski, supra note 9, 6.69). However, with the penetration of TV sets worldwide this 
provision has lost its significance, W. Nordemann, K. Vinck, P. Hertin & G. Meyer, 
“International Copyright and Neighboring Rights Law: Commentary with Special Emphasis 
on the European Community” 405 (Wiley-VCH, 1990). 
24 This was inserted at the Rome Revision (1928) when the right of broadcasting was first 
introduced. 
25 “Compulsory licenses” first appeared in Art. 13(1) of the Berne Convention in Berlin 
Revision (1908).  
26 WIPO, “Guide to the Berne convention for the protection of literary and artistic works” 11-16 
(WIPO, 1978). 




Article 7 (1) of the Rome Convention does to grant a right of prohibition in 
favour of the performing artists, but only the “possibility” of preventing the 
exploitation of their labour if they have not consented thereto. This is a 
considerably lower level of protection as compared to the rights of phonogram 
producers and the broadcasting organizations 28 . Once performing artists 
consented to the use of their performance, such “possibility” is no longer 
available to them. Rather, it is up to the Contracting States to provide 
protection against rebroadcasting, fixation for broadcasting purposes as well 
the use by broadcasting organisations of fixations (Article 7(2) subparagraph 
(2)). In so providing, the Contracting States can provide for compulsory 
licenses to use of the performance. 
 
(2) Statutory Licensing for Phonograms used by Broadcasting 
Organizations 
 
The use of phonograms which have been published for commercial purposes 
by broadcasting organizations is economically the most important situation 
which the Rome Convention was called upon to regulate. According to Article 
12, such phonograms are made available to broadcasting organizations29. The 
remaining question of remuneration was settled in the following way: a single 
remuneration shall be paid by the user to the performers, or the producers of 
the phonograms, or to both. The allocation of that payment between the parties 
is left to domestic legislation. 
 
C. General Compulsory Patent Licensing for the Prevention of Patent 
Abuse  
The Paris Convention and the TRIPS Agreement 30  foresee a general 
recognition of compulsory patent licensing that is also keen on the 
preservation of market competition. In the 1925 Hague revision a new 
provision on compulsory license, namely Article 5A(2), was inserted on the 
request and pressure of industry. Prior thereto, many patent laws had forfeiture 
clauses for lack of working. Compulsory licenses were regarded by industrial 
representatives, such as International Chamber of Commerce, at the 
                                                 
28 Nordemann, Vinck, Hertin & Meyer, supra note 23, 384. 
29 Id., 397. 
30 The relationship between the TRIPS Agreement to the Paris Convention is regulated in Art. 
2(1) of the former, which obliges all Members to comply with Arts. 1 to 12 and 19. 
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negotiation table as the only appropriate sanction for the non-working of 
patents31. Art. 5A stipulates a general purpose for compulsory patent licensing, 
namely to ‘prevent the abuses’ which might result from the exercise of the 
exclusive rights conferred by the patent 32 , for example, failure to work, 
including insufficient working. “Other examples of such abuses may exist in 
cases where the owner of the patent… refuses to grant licenses on reasonable 
terms and thereby hampers industrial development, or does not supply the 
national markets with sufficient quantities of the patented product, or demands 
excessive prices for such products33.” Art. 5A of the Paris Convention has led 
to the worldwide acceptance of compulsory patent licensing regime34.  
 
III. Finding Support for Compulsory Licensing from Advanced 
Countries 
 
The US, UK and Germany recognize compulsory licenses in a series of 
IP-related laws. In the following, copyright law, patent law and communication 
law will be examined. 
 
A. Copyright Law 
Preserving market competition is a major concern for US and UK copyright 
law. 
1. US 
The US Copyright Act generally rejects compulsory licenses that would give 
                                                 
31 A. Menescal, “Those behind the TRIPS Agreement: The influence of the ICC and the AIPPI 
on international intellectual property decisions”. 2 Intellectual Property Quartely 161 (2005). 
32 In cases where the grant of compulsory licenses would not have been sufficient to prevent 
the said abuses, forfeiture of the patent can be provided for. No proceedings for the 
forfeiture or revocation of a patent may be instituted before the expiration of two years from 
the grant of the first compulsory license. A compulsory license may not be applied for before 
the expiration of a period of four years from the date of filing of the patent application or 
three years from the date of the grant of the patent, whichever period expires last; it shall be 
refused if the patentee justifies his inaction by legitimate reasons. Such a compulsory 
license shall be non-exclusive and non-transferable, even in the form of the grant of a 
sub-license, except with that part of the enterprise or goodwill which exploits such license. 
33 G.. H.C. Bodenhausen, “Guide to the Application of the Paris Convention for the Protection 
of Industrial Property” 71 (WIPO reprinted, 1991). 
34 Harnisch, supra note 15, 59. 
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copyright owners a typically lower sum35. Nevertheless, it contains numerous 
compulsory and statutory licensing mechanisms in sections 108 through 122 
and 100436 to prevent the delay and expenses of negotiation with copyright 
owners that would make a voluntary licensing impracticable 37 . As a 
consequence, the fees that copyright owners may collect from many types of 
consumers of their products are controlled to varying degrees by 
administrative agencies and courts38. Pursuant to section 801, the Library of 
Congress shall appoint 3 full-time Copyright Royalty Judges to make 
determinations and adjustments of reasonable terms and rates of royalty 
payments as provided in sections 112(e)(ephemeral recordings by transmitting 
organizations), 114 (non-interactive webcasting), 115 (for making and 
distributing phonorecords to the public for private use), 116 (for public 
performances by means of coin-operated phonorecord players), 118 (for 
non-commercial broadcasting by public broadcasting entities), 119 (for 
secondary transmission of superstations and network stations for private home 
viewing) and 1004 (royalty payment for digital audio recording devices) . 
 
2. UK 
In UK, there is no longer any rule allowing for compulsory copyright license in 
general, equivalent to those for patents39. However, there are at least eight 
distinctive categories of compulsory licenses, three of which address the 
preservation of competition40. Two of the three involve the broadcast industry: 
reproduction of broadcast schedules and use of sound recording in broadcasts 
and cable programme services in a cable program. The last of the three aims 
at the control of monopoly: under section 144 of the Copyright, Designs and 
                                                 
35 P. Goldstein, “Goldstein on Copyright” 1:40-1:41 (Aspen Publishers, 3rd. ed., 2005). 
36 Sec. 107 differs from secs. 108 through 122 in that it requires on-going reassessment while 
the latter rests on the assumption that the relevant cost-and –benefit calculus remains 
constant, Id., 12:15. 
37 P. Goldstein, supra note 35, 7-74. 
38 W. Fisher, “Promises to Keep, Technology, Law and the Future of Entertainment” 184 
(Stanford Law and Politics, 2004). 
39 Cornish, Llewelyn & Aplin, supra note 14, 13-51. 
40 The other five categories are for 1. once elapsed and later revived copyrighted works, 2. 
works which are documents embodying a design existent on January 1, 1989, 3. carrying 
out an order by the Secretary of State regarding the lending of works, 4. retransmitting of a 
wireless broadcast by cable beyond the original broadcast area, 5. works of ‘enemy origin,’ 
Garnett , Davies & Harbottle, supra note 6, 28-03.  
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Patents Act 1988 (CDPA), the Secretary of State, the Office of Fair Trading and 
the Competition Commission are given the power to cancel or modify the 
licensing agreement, and the power to provide that licenses shall be available 
as of right to control anti-competitive or monopolistic practices. The terms of a 
licence available shall, in default of agreement, be settled by the Copyright 
Tribunal on an application by the person requiring the licence41.  
 
B. Patent Law 
Preserving market competition is a major concern for patent laws of US, UK 
and Germany. 
1. US 
Generally speaking, the US has never adopted a statutory regime of 
compulsory license to curb patent misuse. Nor has Congress ever enacted a 
law that generally authorizes compulsory licensing of patents in the public 
interest42. But in practice, the high threshold for issuing permanent injunctive 
relief implies compulsory licensing in cases where patents have been infringed. 
The US Supreme Court reconfirmed its long stance on permanent injunctive 
relief in the 2006 eBay decision43.  
According to eBay, no permanent injunction will be issued immediately after 
the adjudication of infringement and validity of patents and copyrights. Rather, 
the plaintiff must first demonstrate the following four factors are fulfilled before 
he/she can stop the alleged infringer from carrying on its use of the IP he/she 
owned: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available 
                                                 
41 Garnett, Davies & Harbottle, supra note 6, 28-54 et seq. 
42 J. Reichman & C. Hasenzahl, “Non-Voluntary Licensing of Patented Inventions, 
UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development” Issue Paper No. 5, 21 
(2003). 
43 EBay v. MercExchange , 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
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at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that 
injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and 
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest 
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. Clearly the eBay decision is 
not a competition-oriented test. However, if the plaintiff failed to satisfy the 
four-factor test, the alleged infringer can continue his/her use of IP as if a 
compulsory license had been granted to him/her. 
2. UK 
The comptroller has the power to grant a compulsory patent license on such 
terms as he thinks fit in five categories of situations44, any time after the 
expiration of three years or of such other period as may be prescribed from the 
date of the grant of a British patent. Two of the categories are occupied with 
the preservation of market competition: Sections 48 (which differentiates 
between patents with WTO owners and patents with non-WTO owners, and 
the grounds on which compulsory licenses will be granted are more 
cumbersome in the case of WTO owners.) and 51 of the CDPA (following a 
report of the Competition Commission that an undesirable monopolistic 
situation exists or an anti-competitive practice is operating against the public 
interest)45. Given the large number of WTO Members, it suffices to point only 
to section 48A(1) that sets out the following grounds for compulsory licensing: 
UK demand for a patented product is not being met on reasonable terms; 
because of unreasonable restrictions on licensing the patent, exploitation of 
another patented invention, which is technically and economically important, is 
being prevented or hindered; or the development or establishment of 
commercial or industrial activities in the UK are being unfairly prejudiced; 
because of conditions imposed upon licensing the patent, or on disposal or 
use of the patented product or process, either the manufacture, use or 
disposal of unpatented materials or the development or establishment of 
commercial or industrial activities in UK are being unfairly prejudiced. 
                                                 
44 L. Bentley & B. Sherman, “Intellectual Property Law” 578 (Edward Elgar, 3rd. ed., 2009 ). 
45 The other three categories are for Crown use (section. 55- 59), in relation to biotechnological 
inventions, for licenses granted on public health grounds. 
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Compulsory licensing provisions in UK are enmeshed in such a net of 
procedures that it is only the threat of invoking them that carries any significant 
weight46. Six compulsory patent licenses have been granted after World War II. 
It has been confirmed by the High Court of Justice that the comptroller has the 
power to grant compulsory license to import the patented drug and its 
intermediate with a view to their sale in UK, because that amounted to ‘a use 
or exercise of ’ the invention at issue47. 
3. Germany 
According to Article 24 of the German Patent Act, there are two kinds of 
compulsory licenses, one for the public interest and the other for dependent 
patent. A non-exclusive authorization to commercially exploit an invention shall 
be granted by the Federal Patent Court in individual cases (1) if the applicant 
for a license has unsuccessfully endeavored for a reasonable period of time to 
obtain from the patentee consent to exploit the invention under reasonable 
conditions common in trade, and (2) public interest commands a granting of 
compulsory licensing (para. 1). If the applicant cannot exploit his patent without 
infringing on another patent of an earlier date, and if his invention in 
comparison with that of the earlier invention comprises an important technical 
advance of considerable commercial significance, and the conditions listed in 
para. 1 (1) are met, he/she shall have the right to ask the patentee of the 
earlier invention to grant compulsory license (para. 2). In addition, if the 
patentee does not exploit the patented invention or work it predominantly in 
Germany (importation equals local working) and an adequate supply of the 
patented products to the domestic market is not ensured, a compulsory license 
shall be granted within the framework of para. 1 (para. 5).  
In the 1996 “Polyferon” case, the Federal Supreme Court (BGH), in annulling 
the one and only granted compulsory license (1994) after World War II, 
elaborates that from the exclusive position of a right holder alone, no public 
interest can be established, even if the right holder enjoys a de facto 
monopolistic position. Therefore special circumstances must be existent in 
                                                 
46 See Banks Report, cited from Cornish, Llewelyn & Aplin, supra note 14, 7-42. 
47 F. Hoffmann-Lo Roche & Company A. G.’s Patents, [1973] R.P.C. 130, [1972] FSR 385. 
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order to satisfy the public interest requirement. What may come within the 
purview of special circumstances besides abuse of patent rights includes 
technical, economic, social-political and medical perspective, which can 
certainly include the maintenance of market competition48. 
C. Communications Law 
1. US 
In addition to the Copyright Act, the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) began in 2008 to intervene into contractual arrangements between 
satellite cable programming vendors, cable operators and satellite broadcast 
programming vendors. In accordance with the Program Access Rule, the FCC 
requires that exclusive contracts between cable operators, satellite cable 
programming vendors in which a cable operator has an attributable interest or 
satellite broadcast programming vendors in which a cable operator has an 
attributable interest in an area served by a cable operator must be approved by 
the FCC in advance49. The purpose of the Program Access Rule is to prevent 
exclusive contracts from constraining or even blocking the use of copyrighted 
works. In reviewing and disapproving (or approval with conditions) such 
exclusive contracts the FCC can invoke compulsory licensing mechanism. 
 
2. UK 
The issue of ensuring fair and effective competition is also an acute problem in 
the broadcasting of premium sports events, due to the following reasons: 1. 
live high-quality sports retain an enduring appeal for many UK consumers; 2. 
access to this content has driven the development of pay TV in UK; and 3. for 
many years Sky has held the exclusive rights to broadcast many of the most 
sought-after premium sports and therefore has market power in the wholesale 
of these channels.  After taking into account of the fact that Sky’s market 
position is unlikely to change in the next few years, the Office of 
Communications (Ofcom) has on 31 March 2010 exercised its powers under 
section 316 of the Communications Act to ensure fair and effective competition 
and issued the “Pay TV Statement”.  
 
The Pay TV Statement foresees a coming market failure and therefore 
imposes compulsory license on Sky by requiring Sky to offer the most 
                                                 
48 BGH GRUR 96, 193. 
49 FCC, Program Access Rule, 47 CFR Ch. I (10–1–08 Edition), § 76.1000- § 76.1004. 
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important sports channels- Sky Sports 1 and Sky Sports 2 to retailers on 
platforms other than Sky's, at wholesale prices set by Ofcom, and approves 
Sky and Arqiva's request for Sky to offer its own pay TV services on digital 
terrestrial TV ('Picnic'), but conditional on a wholesale must-offer obligation on 
Sky Sports 1 and 2 being in place, with evidence that it has been effectively 
implemented. This conclusion is also conditional on any movies channels 
included in Picnic being offered to other digital terrestrial TV retailers50. 
 
IV. Theoretical Analysis of a Competition-oriented Compulsory Licensing 
A. Justification, Substantive and Procedural Tests 
 
Joseph Kohler argued for compulsory licensing from the view point of social 
obligation in his comments on the “obligation to work one’s patents” pursuant 
to the then German Patent Law. He reasoned that “the underlying idea of such 
a statutory principle is the following: when one is free to exercise his/her right 
or not to, it is then just when his/her slowness does not bring significant 
disadvantages to the general public. However, when it does, the individual may 
not deprive the people of the cultural achievements by not exercising (his/her 
right). The exercise of rights then becomes a social obligation. This applies 
whenever the right-owner possesses a monopolistic position, so as not to 
deprive the country or his/her fellow men of the whole legal regime 
(Rechtsgut)51. 
 
However, the more economic approach to IP law led to the dominant 
complimentarity theory52. According to such theory, while complimenting each 
other, IP law and competition law seek to enhance consumer welfare and 
efficient allocation of resources 53 , and to promote dynamic competition 
                                                 
50 Ofcom, Pay TV Statement, Summary 1.1-1.7. 
51 Kohler, supra note 1, at 613. 
52 It has been suggested that the complementarity theory can be further replaced by an 
integrated innovation-economic concept of IP protection and competition, see R. Podszun, 
“Lizenzverweigerung- Ernstfall im Verhältnis von Kartell- und Immaterialgüterrecht”, in: P. 
Matousek, E. Müller & T. Thanner (Hrgb.), “Jahrbuch Kartell- und Wettbewerbsrecht” 75 
(NWV, 2010). 
53 More than 100 countries in the world have competition laws, the latest example being the 
Malaysian Competition Act 2010 that comes into force on 1 January 2012. The proliferation 




(competition by substitution vs. competition by imitation)54. Competition law 
intervenes into the IP world only when the behavior of IP owners, IP per se or 
market factors other than IP (e.g. standards, network effects) hinders or 
excludes dynamic competition55. The leading example can be found in the 
application of Article 20(1) (against discrimination by dominant undertakings) 
of Act against Restraints of Competition (GWB) in Germany by the BGH56. In 
the 2004 Standard-Spundfass case the BGH imposed an obligation to license 
on the patentee who enjoyed dominant position due to the de-facto standard 
and whose discriminatory refusal to license patents would contravene the 
purpose of GWB to guarantee freedom of competition57. The BGH also rightly 
stated that Article 20(1) GWB serves a different purpose than Article 24 of the 
Patent Act and can therefore be applied in parallel with and in addition to the 
latter58.  
 
In return, IP-internal compulsory licenses should take the functioning and 
preservation of market competition as its substantive test59, and limit IP for 
competition policy reason. As a matter of fact, the functioning and preservation 
of market competition is a completion law concept and shall be construed 
accordingly. Therefore where IP owned by dominant undertakings is 
indispensable to consumers and impossible for other competitors to replicate 
or acquire, the refusal to grant license to use such IP may restrain and even 
hamper (downstream/upstream) market competition, which is imperative for 
the satisfaction of cultural and entertainment needs of the masses and 
boosting innovation, etc. As discussed above, such approach has been well 
adopted by international IP conventions and laws of advanced countries. 
 
With regards to the procedural test of such a general compulsory IP license, it 
is suggested that the license-seeker cannot just go ahead using and infringing 
                                                 
54 J. Drexl, “Is there a ‘more economic approach’ to intellectual property and competition 
law?”, in: J. Drexl (ed.), “Research on Intellectual Property and Competition Law” 44 
(Edward Elgar, 2009). 
55 Id., 47-48. Podszun, supra note 52, at 74. 
56 The examination of competition laws of the US and UK will exceed the limits of this paper. 
For a brief discussion of the US law, see Liu, supra note 4, 764-765. 
57 For an English translation of the case and comment by Matthias Leistner, see 36 IIC 
741-752 (2005).  
58 BGH, Urteil vom 13. 7. 2004 - KZR 40/02 (Lexetius.com/2004,2151), Para.37. 
59 R. Hilty, Renaissance der Zwangzlizenzen im Urheberrecht, 643 GRUR 2009, Heft 7, 643. 
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IP owned by others. Rather he/she must negotiate first with IP-owner and file 
application for compulsory license with courts when negotiation failed. To 
scrutinize sham from sincere negotiations, the German 
“Orange-Book-Standard” case decided by the BGH offers good advice: the 
infringer must have made an unconditional offer to acquire a license from the 
patentee and deposited a sufficient amount for the benefit of the patentee at 
the court, before he/she can file for compulsory license60. However, one should 
not forget that the vast number of potential IP users might not know of the 
existence of IP and commit infringement. Therefore if that is the case, the prior 




Along with worldwide rampant proliferation of patents comes the threat to the 
ideals of open science and free exchange of creative ideas and to follow-on 
research and its application61. Never than before, has the issue of patent 
blockage and of compatibility (forward and backward) becomes so important. 
Cross-licensing and patent pools have limited alleviating effects62.Various 
types of exemptions as solutions for the anti-commons and blockage problem, 
ranging from a fair use exception to the exclusive rights of patents, an opt-in 
exemption, and forfeiture have been proposed63. However, compulsory patent 
licensing is by far the least intrusive and the most easy-to-operate method 




Traditionally, copyright has little to do with competition law due to its less 
exclusive character. But the time has changed. Copyright can impede 
competition much the same way as patents (exemplified by the Microsoft 
case)64. The European Copyright Code proposed by the Wittem Group in April 
                                                 
60 BGH KZR 39/06, 2009 GRUR, 694. 
61 R. L-D Wang, “Biomedical Upstream Patenting and Scientific Research: The Case for 
Compulsory Licenses Bearing Reach-Through Royalties”, 10 Yale J. L. & Tech 253 (2008). 
62 Id., 307-312. 
63 For a summary of all the suggestions being circulated, see Id., 315-318. 
64 For a discussion of this topic see G. B. Ramello, “Copyrights and Antitrust Issues”, in: W. J. 
Gordon & R. Watt (eds.), “The Economics of Copyright” 118 et seq. (Edward Elgar, 2003). 
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201065 tightly points out this danger and advocates that copyright law should 
reflect the core (European) principles and values of law, including freedom of 
competition (freedom of expression and information as well, Preamble). It 
therefore suggests that compulsory license be granted for uses of news 
articles, scientific works, industrial designs, computer programs and databases 
against payment of a negotiated remuneration66, provided that: (i) the use is 
indispensable to compete on a derivative market; (ii) the owner of the copyright 
in the work has refused to license the use on reasonable terms, leading to the 
elimination of competition in the relevant market and (iii) the use does not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the owner of the copyright in 
the work (Art. 5.4). 
 
B. Functions 
1. To Reinstate Compulsory Licensing Especially in IP Late-comer 
Countries 
 
IP less-developed countries, which are at the besiege of hostile international 
environment, can be easily deterred from perceiving compulsory licensing in 
the context of preserving competition and constantly, consciously or not, 
narrowing down the scope of compulsory licensing. To a large extent Taiwan 
typifies such countries.  
 
The Taiwanese Patent Act foresaw from its coming into force in 1949 
compulsory licensing for five categories of events: national emergencies, 
not-for-profit use of a patent for the enhancement of public welfare, where 
failure to reach a licensing agreement with the patentee under reasonable 
commercial terms and conditions within a considerable period of time, to 
remedy restriction of competition. Although seemingly broad in scope, 
compulsory patent licensing has never been applied for until 200267. Only two 
                                                 
65 The European Copyright Code is the result of the Wittem Project established in 2002 as 
collaboration between copyright scholars across the European Union concerned with the 
future development of European copyright law. Its Drafting Committee is composed of Lionel 
Bently, Thomas Dreier, Reto Hilty, Bernt Hugenholtz, Antoon Quaedvlieg, Alain Strowel and 
Dirk Visser. Available at : http://www.copyrightcode.eu/ 
66 According to footnote 54 of the European Copyright Code , the term ‘negotiated 
remuneration’ means that the compulsory license fee is to be negotiated in individual cases, 
and therefore does not imply a role for collective rights management. 
67 The reason was presumably either Taiwanese companies were not in the position to work 
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compulsory licenses (Philips and Tamiflu) were granted by the TIPO against 
foreign patentees.  
 
Despite the extremely low number of granted compulsory license, the TIPO 
initiated to limit its power to grant compulsory license upon application to four 
types of cases, which became law on 29 November 2011 (the coming into 
force of which is expected to be one year later)68. While Types 2 and 3 
(compulsory license of the head patent for the benefit of the dependent patent) 
are common across jurisdictions, Type 4 (of imposing restrictions on 
competition or committing unfair competition) is redundant as a matter of fact 
since courts or the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) are already entitled to make 
decisions on that pursuant to Article 41 of the Fair Trade Act. What really 
stands out is Type 1(Not-for-profit practice that would enhance public interest), 
for two reasons: 1. It does not elaborate on the meaning or scope of public 
interest, which would make people unsure about what amounts to public 
interest in the first place and later impose on them the burden of establishing 
and proving such abstract idea. 2. It limits such compulsory license to not-for 
                                                                                                                                            
patents at issue or simply used them illegally. 
68 Art. 89 of the Taiwanese Patent Act provides: 1. In case of national emergencies other 
circumstances of extreme urgency, the TIPO must grant compulsory license and notify the 
patentee as soon as possible when it is commanded by the “Emergency Decree” issued by 
the President, or requested by other competent authorities which may need to practice the 
patent at issue. 2. Upon application, the TIPO may grant compulsory license in one of the 
following cases and only to the extent that it is necessary: (1) Not-for-profit practice that 
would enhance public interest. (2) The practice of an invention patent or a utility model, 
which possesses important technical improvement(s) with considerable economic 
significance, would inevitably infringe upon other prior inventions or utility models. (3) The 
holder of a plant variety right, which possesses important technical improvement(s) with 
considerable economic significance, must practice biotech patents of others. (4) The 
patentee has imposed restrictions on competition or has committed unfair competition which 
has been adjudicated by court or disposed of by the Fair Trade Commission. 3. The grant of 
a compulsory license with regard to semi-conductor patents is limited to Paragraph 2 (1) and 
(4). 4. The grant of a compulsory license pursuant to Paragraph 2 (1)-(3) is only permissible 
after the applicant has failed to secure a licensing agreement under reasonable commercial 
terms and conditions within a considerable period of time. 5. Patentee, whose patent has 
been compulsorily licensed pursuant to Paragraph 2 (2)-(3), may file with the TIPO 
application with reasonable terms and conditions to grant compulsory license with regard to 
the new invention patent, utility model and plant variety. 
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profit, a limitation that cannot be found in the UK and German patent laws (see 
supra III B. 2 & 3)69. To sum up, the revision of compulsory patent licensing 
provisions is for the worse. 
 
Only with the help of a generalized theory and doctrine can compulsory 
licensing be reinstated in its proper position and countries that need 
compulsory licensing to preserve competition in their domestic markets can be 
assured that such need can and should be satisfied accordingly. 
 
2. To Accelerate Voluntary Licensing  
 
One may assume that the general possibility of granting a compulsory license 
alone poses deterrent effect and enhances right-holders’ readiness to signing 
a licensing agreement. Therefore the ultimate goal of compulsory licensing is 
not to deprive IP holders of their rights, but only to function as the last resort to 
stimulate the patentee into working or voluntarily licensing the patent. From the 
perspective of royalty negotiation, compulsory license functions as a shift from 
entirely ex ante (before use) negotiation to partially ex ante and partially ex 
post (after use) negotiation. As such, compulsory license does not sabotage 
but rather accelerate voluntary licensing, because it avoids delays and 
excessive costs incurred by prolonged negotiation. Moreover, the partially ex 
post approach to determining royalties can provide parties better basis upon 
which to estimate the real value of the patents used because concrete 
outcomes derived from the actual use of patents will be at the parties’ 
disposal70.  
 
C. Solving Some Thorny Issues Surrounding Compulsory Licensing 
 
In order to make the competition-oriented compulsory licensing theory work, 
                                                 
69 Taiwanese Copyright Act allows only sporadic and limited compulsory licensing for 
recording of musical works already recorded and published (Art. 69) , for the use of sound 
recording (Art. 26 (3)), and for preparing pedagogical texts (Art. 47). With the enactment of 
the Act to Promote the Culturally Innovative Industries on 3 February 2010, the TIPO is 
empowered to grant compulsory licenses to use ‘orphan works’ upon deposit of 
compensation equivalent to the reasonable royalty that the average voluntary negotiation 
would have agreed to. However, prior to that all possible means must have been exhausted 
and to no avail to determine the identity of the author or his whereabouts (Art. 24). 
70 Wang, supra note 61, 322. 
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the difficult issue of determining reasonable compensation for compulsorily 
licensed IP and which agency71 is to administer such regime have to be 
solved.  
 
1. Determining the Reasonable Compensation 
There are at least three separate methods to determine the reasonable 
compensation, which can be used individually, alternatively and/or 
cumulatively. 
 
(1) Looking into the Original Licensing Agreement 
 
Oftentimes some readily available proxies for a fair compensation can be 
found by looking into the original licensing agreement between the parties at 
dispute. In the Phillips CD-R cases, the other agreed method of calculating 
royalty is 3% of the net sales price as opposed to ¥10 per disc. 3% of net sales 
price was once agreed upon between Philips and its licensees and can be 
regarded as reasonable. It therefore shall have a prima facie reasonableness, 
and if the patentee denies such assumption, the burden of proof shall rest with 




The royalty rate is most likely fixed by comparison with relevant rates charged 
by the patentee or others in the industry for similar licenses72. The German 
Federal Supreme Court also states in the ‘Orange-Book-Standard’ decision 
that if the license-seeker alleges that the royalty demanded by the patentee 
was excessively high reaching the degree of abuse, or the patentee refuses to 
specify the royalty, then the license-seeker should be allowed to determine a 
reasonable royalty in accordance with the equitable standards. Otherwise the 
license-seeker would run the risk of overpaying the patentee in order to satisfy 
the requirement of making unconditional offer to sign licensing agreement73.’ 
 
Licensing is a common practice in all fields of industries and licensing 
agreements are collectable data. According to Article 28 of the Act on Patents 
Invented by Employees, the German Arbitration Panel shall resolve the 
                                                 
71 This issue has been addressed by K-C. Liu, supra note 3, 774. 
72 Cornish, Llewelyn & Aplin, supra note 14, 323. 
73 BGH KZR39/06, paras. 38, 39. 
22 
 
disputes between employees and employers if they cannot agree upon the 
reasonable compensation for employees. In order to discharge its duty, the 
Arbitration Panel has been active and effective in proposing acceptable 
suggestions, out of which a volume of ‘Licensing Rates for Technical 
Inventions’ has long been published and widely used in Germany 74 . By 
collecting the licensing agreements of all areas and classifying them according 
to the patents, industries, major licensors etc., one can easily get a fairly god 
picture of how the reasonable compensation should be for a specific licensing 
agreement. In addition, there is much literature75 and even online services76 
available on the market, which provide such information77. 
 
(3) 25 Per Cent Rule 
 
In addition, a fairly simple ’25 Per Cent Rule’ (‘Rule’) has been established and 
adopted by US courts over the last 40 years. The Rule suggests that the 
licensee pay a royalty rate equivalent to 25 per cent of his/her expected profits 
for the product that incorporates the IP at issue. The Rule has been useful not 
only in valuating patents, but also in copyright, trade secret and know-how 
contexts78. Focus of the Rule is placed on long-term and fully-loaded profits79.  
 
2. Which Institution is to administer the Granting of IP-internal 
Compulsory Licenses? 
 
In Germany it is the Federal Patent Court that is responsible for the granting of 
                                                 
74 O. Hellebrand, G. Kaube & R. v. Falckenstein, “Lizenzsätze für technische Erfindungen” (3 
Aufl., 2007).  
75 R. Parr, “Royalty Rates for Licensing Intellectual Property” (Intellectual Property Research 
Associates, Inc., 4th ed., 2010). 
76 E.g. www.royaltyource.com, www.tenkwizard.com 
77 Arguably this method will not work for standardized technology that may be covered by a 
number of complementary patents held by different patentees and each patentee may be 
tempted to charge the monopoly price for the whole technology which creates a “tragedy of 
the anti-commons.” In that case, the compulsory license needs to take the involved multiple 
patents as a whole and turn to the other two methods for help. 
78 R. Goldscheider, J. Jarosz & C. Mulhern, “Use of the Twenty-Five Percent Rule in Valuating 
Intellectual Property”, in: R. Parr (ed.), “Royalty Rates for Licensing Intellectual Property” 
31-31 (Wiley, 2007). 
79 Id., 34. 
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compulsory patent license. In UK, in the field of copyright it is the Secretary of 
State, the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission that are 
responsible for the granting of compulsory license; in the realm of patents, the 
comptroller of the Patent Office can upon a report of the Competition 
Commission issue compulsory licenses. In the US it is courts that can issue 
compulsory licensing. It is suggested that courts are best situated to administer 
a general-competition oriented IP-internal compulsory licensing (as opposed to 
compulsory licensing via competition law), for three reasons: 1. Intellectual 
Property Office (IPO) as administrative agency is not suited to play the role of 
referee between different citizens. 2. IPO is more prone to be captured by IP 
industries and interest groups than courts due to long and frequent interaction 
with them. 3. Courts can better apply IP laws against the background of 
competition law and its consideration than IPO. 
 
V. Excursus: Challenging the Soundness of the Categorical Denial of 
Compulsory Trademark Licensing 
The categorical exclusion of compulsory trademark licensing by the TRIPS 
Agreement has mostly found blind support (:“This is based on the principle that 
there can scarcely be any justification”80). However, it is not in line with the 
“rule of reason” stance that has triumphed over the “per-se illegal” rule in many 
jurisdictions81. Second of all, it is worth pointing out that the US Fair Trade 
Commission contemplated in the 1970s to introduce compulsory licensing of 
trademarks as a measure in eliminating monopoly power in companies which 
enjoy ownership of well-known marks82. It is contended by this paper that there 
might very well be scenarios in which compulsory trademark licensing is not 
only justified but also imperative.  
 
Let’s turn to history for inspiration. On 31 October 2005 the Department of 
Health (DOH) filed with the TIPO an application for a compulsory license to 
use a patented drug owned by Gilead Sciences, Inc. USA and exclusively 
licensed to F. Hoffmann – La Roche Ltd, Switzerland. The application was 
driven by the fear that an epidemic of avian flu might break out in Taiwan. The 
TIPO approved conditionally the application to manufacture via pharmacy 
                                                 
80 Gervais, supra note 13Error! Bookmark not defined., 2.185. 
81 It is the case in the US, EU, Japan, Korea and Taiwan, for details see Liu, supra note 10. 
82 See M, Leaffer, “Sixty Years of the Lanham Act: The Decline and Demise of Monopoly 




companies such patented capsules until 31 December 2007. Thanks to the 
fact that the feared epidemic did not break out and the compulsory license had 
not been implemented. Nevertheless, the wide media coverage of the dispute 
surrounding the issuance of such a compulsory patent licensing and the public 
anxiety over the allegedly immanent epidemic have made the trademark of 
such patented drug “Tamiflu” (to be more exact its Chinese translation 
“Ke-Liu-Gan”) well known in Taiwan, reaching the fame of a household brand.  
 
Suppose that the avian epidemic did break out and the implementation of the 
granted compulsory patent licensing becomes unavoidable. The general public 
needs to accept drug prescribed by the DOH against avian flu in very short 
notice. Neither the patent number (129988), nor the name of the patent (a new 
chemical compound, its synthesis and use for healing) means anything to the 
public83. What better reference there is than the trademark of “Tamiflu” being 
put on the manufactured drugs? Although admittedly the referral use of the 
trademark “Tamiflu” might be allowed eventually, but not without legal 
uncertainty. There is evident need of and justification for compulsory licensing 
of the trademark “Tamiflu.” As all compulsory licenses are always granted with 
conditions and limitations, such as the period, place and price, the compulsory 
licensing of “Tamiflu” can surely include arrangements for averting the 
likelihood of confusion and assuring quality control. In the present case, a 
notice of “Tamiflu made with compulsory license of a patent held by 
Hoffmann – La Roche” and the condition that the manufacture shall be 
subject to the surveillance of Hoffmann – La Roche, can easily serve the 
purpose. 
 
                                                 
83 In the case mentioned in supra note 47, it must be the same for British consumers when 
confronted with a patented drug which had a patent number ‘864,824’ and a strange name 
of “chlordiazepoxide”. It would be much easier if its very well-know trademark 
‘Librium’(tranquillizer) were used. 
